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Mali Under Siege: Tracking the Fuel Blockade Crippling Bamako
Attacks by a jihadist group on fuel convoys bound for Bamako, the capital of Mali, have destroyed more than 130 tankers since September, a Bellingcat investigation has found.
The systematic attacks by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) have brought Bamako and other regions of the West African nation to a standstill as the Al Qaeda-affiliated militia uses economic warfare to pressure the military government.
Landlocked Mali depends on fuel imports transported via tankers by road from neighbouring Senegal and Ivory Coast. Disrupting these convoys strikes directly at the country’s “economic core”, the independent global conflict monitor ACLED said.
Mali has struggled to contain Islamist insurgent groups since a rebellion in the country’s north in 2012. Large swathes of the country remain outside government control despite the junta’s pledges to root out jihadists. Since 2021, Bamako has relied heavily on a Russian security partnership, first with Wagner and now its Africa Corps successor created by the Russian Ministry of Defense, after cutting ties with French and UN peacekeeping missions.
JNIM, an Islamist coalition affiliated with Al Qaeda, has been designated as a terrorist organisation by several countries including the United States, United Kingdom, Australia and Canada. Mostly active in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, it has become one of Africa’s deadliest militant groups.
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Bellingcat has used open source methods to track the JNIM blockade across key supply routes in Mali, verifying evidence of six separate attacks across three regions between mid-September and early November which destroyed more than 130 fuel tankers.
Héni Nsaibia, senior West Africa analyst at ACLED, said the campaign marked an escalation of JNIM’s economic warfare tactics, which are aimed at weakening the military regime by undermining its legitimacy.
While the blockade has not caused a high death toll, Nsaibia said the economic and social repercussions were severe, with fuel shortages disrupting trade and transport across much of the country. It is “a humiliation for the military regime in Bamako, which has been unable to secure the country’s main trade and supply routes,” the analyst told Bellingcat.
A Communications War
Monitoring conflict in West Africa’s Sahel region is especially difficult due to limited digital connectivity, restricted access for journalists, and state controls on reporting. Yet the blockade has generated a large volume of verifiable online material, making it possible to track using open source methods.
JNIM hosts its main media channel on ChirpWire, an encrypted social media application. The group set out its long-term ambitions on the platform on Nov. 20, Jacob Boswall, a senior journalist at BBC Monitoring who analyses jihadist propaganda in the Sahel, told Bellingcat. JNIM urged Malians, and Bamako residents in particular, to rise up and establish an Islamist government based on Sharia.
The group’s “communications are now predominantly in video format – a shift from the previous written statements,” Boswall said. Since September, videos posted to JNIM channels and circulated on social media show a series of attacks on fuel convoys in southern Mali. These posts, Nsaibia said, were intended to “directly undermine the centre of power, where the regime’s credibility is most at stake.”
In a televised address the night before Independence Day on Sep. 22, the country’s military leader, Colonel Assimi Goïta, urged people to “resist disinformation campaigns orchestrated by armed terrorist groups”. Nsaibia told Bellingcat that the launch of a new media channel highlighting operations by JNIM in the country’s south shows “a deliberate calibration of the group’s public messaging” toward southern audiences, including the junta’s core support base.
Mapping the Siege
Bellingcat verified half a dozen JNIM attacks on fuel convoys in Mali, finding open source evidence of more than 130 burnt-out tankers on four separate routes, illustrating the scale of the campaign. It must be noted that it was not possible to match all the torched vehicles visible in the satellite imagery with vehicles seen in footage posted online.
Follow a detailed timeline of the attacks by scrolling through this map, you can interact with it by clicking incident dates or by zooming and dragging.
Three attacks occurred northwest of Bamako against convoys arriving from Senegal, with two taking place less than 70 km from the capital.
The other three attacks took place southeast of Bamako, and targeted convoys travelling up from Ivory Coast.
On Sept. 14, fighters ambushed a fuel convoy traveling from Senegal in the region of Kayes. Videos recorded by fighters and people at the scene show dozens of burning and destroyed tankers. One video shows a tanker engulfed in flames and exploding, and insurgents firing machine guns at vehicles which spray fuel through multiple bullet holes.
A Malian military light tactical vehicle (ACMAT ALTV) also appears to have been hit, with one visible casualty (graphic footage blurred).
Bellingcat identified the general location of the site using NASA FIRMS, an open source tool which uses remote-sensing to detect fire activity. We matched the locations of tankers visible in the insurgent-filmed footage to those on a Sep. 19 satellite image, confirming the exact location of the ambush was 14.55455, -9.98426.
Planet Labs satellite imagery captured five days after the attack shows more than 50 tankers at the site, over 30 of which appear blackened by burn marks.
On Sep. 19, a fuel convoy was attacked between the villages of Neguela and Soribougou in the Koulikoro region, according to reports on social media. By comparing medium-resolution satellite imagery from Sept. 16 and Sept. 27, we identified new burn marks on the road at 12.90289, -8.56459, less than 70 km northwest of Bamako.
Bellingcat verified the precise location by matching high-resolution satellite imagery captured on Nov. 22 with the configuration of nine burnt-out tankers seen in footage posted online in the aftermath of the attack.
On Oct. 17, JNIM claimed via ChirpWire to have ambushed a fuel convoy between the towns of Kolondieba and Kidiana in the Sikasso region. NASA FIRMS data corroborated this claim, showing heat signatures along this road consistent with fire activity.
Bellingcat verified the location of the attack through satellite imagery captured on Oct. 21, which shows 50 burnt tankers. Verified footage, geolocated to 10.82640, -6.67186, filmed by what appear to be fighters on motorcycles, shows a long line of burnt-out tankers, matching the satellite evidence.
On Oct. 21, another attack occurred near Sikasso. Although NASA FIRMS data did not detect a fire, Bellingcat geolocated footage (left) showing multiple destroyed tankers and what appears to be a dead body next to a weapon (graphic footage was blurred.) The location was verified by matching the distinctive three-towered structure seen in one of the videos (right) to 11.17092, -5.62559.
Satellite imagery from Oct. 25 shows more than 40 tankers destroyed at the site, matching those seen in the footage.
On Oct. 28, JNIM claimed a second ambush between the villages of Neguela and Soribougou, less than 70 km northwest of Bamako.
This was corroborated by NASA FIRMS data, which indicated fire activity in the area. A comparison of medium-resolution satellite imagery captured hours before the attack and on the day after the attack confirmed the location as: 12.90847, -8.60058, with smoke plumes rising from the site on Sep. 29.
On Oct. 30, Telegram channels linked to Russia’s Africa Corps circulated aerial footage showing fuel convoys traveling under military escort, supported by helicopters. One of these clips has been geolocated to the southern route toward Bamako. Other footage disseminated by state-aligned media has shown convoys arriving in the capital under heavy military protection, indicating that the junta is succeeding at getting some fuel through.
On Nov. 6, JNIM claimed an attack on fuel tankers between the cities of Zégoua and Sikasso in a statement posted to ChirpWire. Footage posted later to the group’s newly created media channel claimed to show the attack. NASA FIRMS did not detect fire activity in this region, but Bellingcat verified the location by matching the roadside structures seen in footage showing the aftermath of the attack to Google satellite imagery, geolocating it to: 11.12997, -5.60889.
A comparison of medium resolution imagery taken on Nov. 6 (prior to the attack) and Nov. 13 shows a large burn mark at this location, which is consistent with at least nine destroyed tankers seen in the footage and the reported timing of the attack.
Disruption of Daily Life
The fuel blockade has paralysed Mali. Food prices have soared, universities have suspended classes, and the US and the UK embassies have withdrawn non-essential staff. Social media videos verified by Bellingcat show people in Bamako queuing for fuel in lines stretching hundreds of meters and, in some cases, pushing their vehicles after pumps ran dry. A video verified from Oct. 23 shows a single fuel tanker in Bamako being followed by a large number of vehicles. The video’s caption suggests the motorists were hoping to obtain petrol.
The blockade’s broader effects can also be observed from space. NASA’s Black Marble nighttime imagery shows a noticeable dimming of Bamako’s lights when comparing May 29 and Oct. 25 – dates chosen outside of Mali’s rainy season to ensure clear skies for a reliable comparison. Mali relies on a “roughly equal mix of diesel and hydraulic sources”, meaning reduced fuel flows can cause diminished electricity availability and consumption, which is consistent with the dimming seen from space.
NASA Black Marble imagery from May 29 and Oct. 25 shows a difference between Bamako’s lights.
This investigation shows how open source information can help track a conflict that is often not possible with traditional reporting. Bellingcat has previously documented JNIM’s targeting of convoys in neighbouring Burkina Faso. By monitoring online content, geolocating footage and carrying out satellite analysis, it is possible to piece together a detailed view of a crisis that has left much of Mali in the dark.
Youri van der Weide and Miguel Ramalho contributed to this report.
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